Cairn 3D Cairn 3D

Security statement

Last revised 4 October 2026

How Cairn is built and defended, written for the people who have to assess it: an organisation's IT staff, a security reviewer, or anyone deciding whether to put survey data on it. It describes the software as it is now, and names what it does not do.

How Cairn is delivered, and where responsibility sits

Cairn is a self-contained package an organisation installs on hardware it controls. There is no vendor-operated service behind it: we cannot reach an installation, read anything on it, or patch it. Updates are applied deliberately by that organisation's Administrator. The software, its defences and its defects are ours; the server, the network, the accounts, the keys, the backups and the data are theirs.

The application makes no outbound network call of its own — no telemetry, crash reporting, analytics, licence check or update check. The server opens only two kinds of outbound connection, both optional, both set up by the organisation and both started by a person: account invitations and password resets, sent through the mail server the organisation configures, and a street-address lookup that a Surveyor or Administrator submits, sent to the lookup server the organisation nominates. Beyond those, the server's one use of a socket is to determine the machine's own address on its network, so that a Share link copied from the dashboard still works from another computer; it transmits nothing.

Accounts and sign-in

Mail is optional, and goes only through the mail server the organisation configures. With it, an invitation, an Administrator's password reset and "Request a password reset" each send a temporary password, generated by Cairn and changed at first sign-in, to the account's own address and to no other; no message carries Project content. Without it, an invitation or an Administrator's reset shows the temporary password once, to that Administrator, and "Request a password reset" marks the account for an Administrator, as it also does when a send fails. Either way that request answers identically whether or not the address belongs to an account, and is throttled per calling address rather than per account, so the answer cannot be used to discover who has an account here.

Authorisation

Share links

A Share link grants anonymous read access to exactly one Project, and its token is randomly generated. Expiry is chosen when the link is made — any number of days up to a year, thirty by default, or none — and it can be revoked at any moment, taking effect on the holder's next request rather than when their session ends. A link may carry a password, stored with PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 and a salt unique to that link; wrong guesses are throttled on both the link and the calling address. As of this source the stored hash is no longer returned by the view that lists a Project's links, which still carries the token because a link cannot be revoked without first being found.

A Share holder is served a reduced description of the Project, with every other link's token and password, every export row and all key material removed. The only write accepted from one is adding an Annotation; every other method on every other address is refused. Reading is narrow too: the rule admits exactly three addresses — the reduced description, the Project's Annotations, and the caller's own identity — so a Share holder cannot upload, delete, export a Measurement CSV or reach another Project. The Navisworks viewpoint export is not among them, and is therefore not available to a Share holder in this version; a signed-in Client account does have it.

Transport and browser protections

HTTPS is terminated by the proxy bundled with the package, and the application listens only behind it. On a workstation the proxy publishes a loopback port with a certificate the machine makes for itself; at an organisation's own domain it publishes the standard web ports and obtains a public certificate automatically. Every response carries an enforcing Content-Security-Policy — scripts only from the installation itself, images only from it or from data the page already holds, objects not at all, no remote host of any kind — alongside X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff, X-Frame-Options: DENY, Referrer-Policy: same-origin, and a no-store cache policy on Cairn's own pages and scripts.

Data at rest, and custody of the key

Original Scan files can be encrypted at rest with AES-256-GCM, applied in chunks so a multi-gigabyte file is verifiable as it is read rather than only at the end. Each Project has its own key, wrapped under a key derived with Argon2id from the installation's active key. Encryption is chosen when a Project is created and is off unless chosen.

The installation's key is generated at installation, kept wrapped in the data folder, and opened by a secret the host supplies into memory at every start — on Windows a user-scoped platform secret store, on supported Linux a systemd encrypted credential. A copy of Cairn's data and configuration alone cannot recover it. If the host cannot supply the secret, Cairn stays locked rather than inventing a replacement, and recovery is from a copy the organisation holds outside the machine. A named Administrator can rotate the key from the dashboard; the event is recorded without the key value.

What this does not cover. File-level encryption applies to the original Scans: the converted viewing copy, Models, Panoramas, Annotations and Project descriptions are not encrypted file by file. The threat defended against is offline theft of the storage; it is no defence against a running server somebody has taken control of, because a running Cairn must read the data to serve it.

Uploads

Format is checked against contents rather than filename. LAS, LAZ, E57, IFC and DXF are matched against their file signature and OBJ against a structural reading of its first part, both as the upload streams — so a mislabelled very large file is refused after a small amount has been written rather than after all of it, and a refused upload is removed rather than left behind. LandXML is the exception and is stored without a content check, having no signature to match. Uploads are capped in size and refused when free disk would fall below the reserve, leaving existing data untouched.

Backups

Cairn signs every backup archive it writes. A checksum only shows a file is undamaged — whoever can rewrite the archive rewrites the checksum beside it — whereas the signature shows the archive is the one this installation produced. The verifying half is a public fingerprint an operator may copy freely; the signing half never leaves the machine and is never written into a backup or a diagnostic bundle. Restore is an offline operation enforced by the operating system, and an archive containing link members is refused rather than unpacked.

Logging, monitoring and diagnostics

There is no telemetry. Operational logs are local: one file per UTC day, kept ninety days with the installation's data, each entry carrying the time, the caller's address as resolved behind a declared proxy, the action, how long the request had taken and a stable Project identifier — never the contents of a Project, and never a Project's or an uploaded file's name. An operator sees the state of each part of the installation from a System Health area in the dashboard, and a failure serious enough to need attention raises a notice that stays on screen until somebody dismisses it, even if the failure clears by itself; each dismissal is recorded with who dismissed it and when (see Known limitations). Anything that must leave the machine goes in the diagnostic bundle an Administrator or a Surveyor produces. By default it excludes Project names and identifiers, coordinates, request addresses, Share link tokens, passwords, encryption keys and the environment; it carries Project names and identifiers only when the person producing it consents for that one bundle, and that choice is logged. It is never sent automatically.

Supply chain and assurance

Dependencies are pinned. Every change runs the same gates before it can merge: linting, strict type checking on the server and in the browser code, the server test suite, the browser unit tests, end-to-end tests in a real browser, visual regression, a dependency vulnerability audit and a secret scan. Separately, the repository's full history is scanned for secrets once a week and whenever somebody asks for it. Each package ships a software bill of materials in CycloneDX format, a complete third-party notices file, and a manifest listing every file with its size and SHA-256, the version, the image names, the build time and the exact source revision the image was built from.

Independent penetration testing has not been carried out, and the formal threat model is not yet complete. Both are planned work.

Security updates

There is one release channel. Cairn never updates itself and never checks for an update; an Administrator applies one by replacing the package folder and running the supplied upgrade command, which verifies the new package's checksum, takes and verifies a backup first, loads the new images, recreates the containers against the existing data and reports the version then running. Offline installation is supported throughout.

A release carrying a security fix is marked security-critical on the Release notes page, and during the pilot notice of one goes to the operator contact recorded for the installation. The long-term notification channel, and how long a version continues to receive fixes, will be published; neither is decided yet, and this page will not guess at them.

Reporting a security problem

Email Cairn3D@bradyoffice.au with Security in the subject line. Include what you did, what happened, what you expected, the version shown in the sign-in page footer and the approximate time. Never include Project content, client identifiers, coordinates, credentials, encryption keys or a working Share link — describe them instead. There is no published response time; see Support.

Known limitations